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Booth, the Payne Court also acknowledged that the Booth opinion
98
was a five to four decision.
Applying these principles to Oyola, the court considered the
interest of the State in providing information to the sentencing
court with regard to the psychological impact upon the victim. 9 9
The Oyola court denied defendant's request for resentencing
opining that "CPL 380.50(2)(b) advances a legitimate State
interest, and its application in this case did not deprive the
defendant of any of his constitutionally-guaranteed rights." 10 0
The court concluded that "[t]he terms of CPL 380.50(2)(b)
advance the State's 'legitimate interest in * * * reminding the
sentencer that just as the [convicted criminal] should be
considered as an individual, so too the victim is an
10 1
individual.'"
As the Oyola decision points out, the New York Due Process
Clause goes only as far as the Federal Due Process Clause in
protecting a convicted defendant from the arbitrary sentencing so
often involved with victim impact statements.

SUPREME COURT
ALBANY COUNTY
Bradstreet v. Sobo I102
(decided July 17, 1995)

Plaintiff contended that defendant's regulation prohibiting
home-schooled students from participating in interscholastic
sports constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of

98. Id. at 817.

99. People v. Oyola, 215 A.D.2d 597, 598, 626 N.Y.S.2d 849, 850 (2d
Dep't 1995).
100. Id.
101. Id. (citation omitted).

102. 165 Misc. 2d 931, 630 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1995).
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both the Federal1 03 and New York State Constitutions.1 0 4
Plaintiff further contended that the regulation also violated the
Due Process Clause of the Federal 05 and New York State
Constitutions. 106 Bradstreet moved and Sobol cross-moved for
summary judgment. 10 7 Plaintiff's motion was denied and
defendant's motion was granted. 108 The court denied Bradstreet's
equal protection claim on the ground that the State regulation
bore a rational relationship to a legitimate State purpose. 109 In
denying the due process claim, the court held that the plaintiff

had not been "deprived of a property or liberty interest." 110
Charlotte Bradstreet was a fourteen year old girl from Steuben
County, New York. 111 Her parents decided that she would be
112
home-schooled rather than attend the local public school.
Although she did not attend the public school, the eighth grade
student wanted to be permitted to play interscholastic sports in
the Avoca Central School District. 113 She was precluded from
playing because the school had instituted a regulation that only
allowed students who were in regular attendance at the school to
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause provides
in pertinent part: "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id.
104. Bradstreet, 165 Misc. 2d at 932, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 487. N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 11. This section provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof." Id.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause provides in
pertinent part: "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.. . ." Id.
106. Bradstreet, 165 Misc. 2d at 932, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 487; N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Id. Plaintiff
also alleged that the regulation violated section 301 of the Education Law.
Bradstreet, 165 Misc. 2d at 933, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 487-88. See N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 301 (McKinney 1995). The court rejected this contention. Bradstreet,
165 Misc. 2d at 933, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 487-88.
107. Bradstreet, 165 Misc. 2d at 931-32, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 932-33, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 487-88.
110. Id. at 932, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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participate in interscholastic sports.1
reads as follows:

4

817

The regulation in question

Registration. A pupil shall be eligible for interschool competition
in a sport during a semester, provided that he is a bona fide
student, enrolled during the first 15 school days of such

semester, is registered in the equivalent of three regular courses,
is meeting the physical education requirement, and has been in
regular attendance 80 percent of the school time, bona fide

absence caused by personal illness excepted. 115

Plaintiff, Charlotte's mother, brought this suit on her behalf to
annul the regulation, claiming that the regulation constituted a
violation of her daughter's equal protection and due process
rights under both the Federal and New York State
Constitutions. 116 In addition, Bradstreet claimed that the
regulation conflicted with provisions of the Education Law. 117
The suit was brought against Thomas Sobol, the New York State
Commissioner of Education who represented the interests of the
school. 118

In assessing the plaintiff's due process claim, the court stated
that there can be no due process violation unless a person is
"deprived of a property or liberty interest." 119 The court stated
that since plaintiff did not advance the argument that Bradstreet's
liberty had been deprived, the court had only to determine
whether participation in interscholastic sports is a "property"
interest within the definition of due process. 120 However, the
court determined that a student does not have a property interest
in participating in interscholastic sports. 12 1 In deciding that
plaintiffs due process claim was without merit, the court cited
114.
115.
(1991).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. VIII, § 135.4(c)(7)(ii)(b)(2)
Bradstreet, 163 Misc. 2d at 932, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
Id.
Id. at 931, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
Id. at 932, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
Id.
Id.
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People v. Leonard,122 in which a student who had been banished

from the campus of a state university was found to have "no
'property' or 'liberty' interest in being present on campus
grounds." 12 3
Citing the rule established in Caso v. New York State Public
High School Athletic Ass'n, 124 the Bradstreet court characterized
any interest in participating in school sports programs as a "mere
expectation," and, thus, not one subject to due process
protection. 125 In Caso, the petitioner argued that his
constitutional due process rights were violated as a result of a
school's refusal to declare him eligible to participate in an
interscholastic sports competition.126 It was held that such
participation "is not a substantial right unless denial is based on
an abuse of a student's fundamental rights or predicated on a
suspect basis."127 Neither a fundamental right claim or a suspect
classification claim was advanced by Bradstreet in the instant
case. 128
In evaluating Bradstreet's equal protection claim, the court
began by stating that where a suspect classification or
fundamental right claim is not advanced, "a regulation will
withstand an equal protection challenge if it bears some rational
relationship to a legitimate State purpose. ' 12 9 The Bradstreet
court cited Schneider v. Ambach, 130 wherein the court found that
the rational basis standard should be applied when evaluating a
122. 62 N.Y.2d 404, 465 N.E.2d 831, 477 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1984).
123. Id. at 409, 465 N.E.2d at 834, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 114-15. While the

Leonard court found no due process violation, the order banishing the appellant
from the university campus and the subsequent conviction for trespass were
vacated on the ground that the state had produced no evidence that the

banishment order had a legitimate purpose. Id. at 411, 465 N.E.2d at 836, 477
N.Y.S.2d at 116.
124. 78 A.D.2d 41, 434 N.Y.S.2d 60 (4th Dep't 1980).
125. Bradstreet, 165 Misc. 2d at 932, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 487 (citation
omitted).

126. Caso, 78 A.D.2d at 46-47, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
127. Id.
128. Bradstreet, 165 Misc. 2d at 932, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
129. Id.

130. 135 A.D.2d 284, 526 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dep't 1988).
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challenge to "an administrative regulation as arbitrary and
capricious," as opposed to a more stringent strict scrutiny
review. 131
In the present case, Sobol contended that the regulation which
limits participation in interscholastic athletics serves several
legitimate state purposes. 132 Some of the objectives cited by the
Commissioner included "promoting loyalty and school spirit,"
"securing role models for other students," and avoiding problems
associated with the "quasi-curricular nature of interschool
activities." 133 The court agreed that such purposes were
legitimate state interests which could be furthered by the
regulation. 134 Rejecting the equal protection claim, the court
stated that it could "discern no good reason why [participation in
school athletics] should be extended to persons who do not attend
the school." 135
Although plaintiff, Bradstreet, alleged violations of the Federal
Constitution as well as the New York State Constitution, the
court did not specifically cite any federal cases in support of its
decision. However, the court in Caso discussed the federal
caselaw pertaining to students alleging due process violations. In
Walsh v. LouisianaHigh School Athletic Ass'n, 136 the court held
that the Federal Due Process Clause does not protect a student
from a school's denial of his or her athletic eligibility, because
such a question was not "substantial."

13 7

The Caso court also

Odle, 138

which stated that "unless athletic
cited Albach v.
regulations deny an athlete a protected fundamental right or
classify him or her on a suspect basis, e.g., religion or race,
139
athletic programs are not subject to Federal review."
131. Id. at 288, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Bradstreet, 165 Misc. 2d at 932-33, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
Id.
Id. at 933, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
Id.
616 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 156.
531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976).

139. Caso, 78 A.D.2d at 46, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 64. The Albach court stated
the matter as follows: "The supervision and regulation of high school athletic
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However, since New York's regulation did not violate a
fundamental right or impinge on a suspect class, it is almost
certain that the result would have been the same under the
Federal Constitution.

WYOMING COUNTY
People v. Ayers 14 0
(decided January 6, 1995)
The defendant claimed that statements he made to the sheriff's
department were obtained in violation of the Due Process Clauses
of the Federal1 41 and New York State 142 Constitutions. The
defendant contended that his motion to suppress should have been
granted because the statements he made to the Sheriff were
involuntary and/or untrustworthy, by virtue of the defendant's
deficient mental state. 143 The Supreme Court, Wyoming County,
found that, absent official coercion, the defendant's mental
144
condition alone did not render the statements involuntary.
Furthermore, the People had proven the voluntariness of his
statements beyond a reasonable doubt, thus vitiating any violation
145
of the defendant's due process rights.
The defendant was interviewed after a homicide team
investigation labeled him a suspect in the murder of Charles
programs remain within the discretion of appropriate state boards, and are not
within federal cognizance under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the regulations deny
an athlete a constitutionally protected right or classify him or her on a suspect
basis." Albach, 531 F.2d at 985.
140. 163 Misc. 2d 739, 622 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. Wyoming County 1995).
141. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision states in relevant part:

"No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . ." Id.
142. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision states in relevant part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of

law." Id.
143. Ayers, 163 Misc. 2d at 740, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 745, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
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